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
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
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INTEGRATION OF GERMAN TERRITORIAL FORCES IN NATO PLANNING

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HEINZ FIEBIG

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demands that we fully understand the contributions of the German Territorial Army. The realization that Wartime Host Nation Support to U.S. forces is a direct responsibility of the German Territorial Army, and this support will impact on the way NATO forces wage war in the event of Warsaw Pact aggression, mandates the formal integration of the Territorial Army into the NATO planning system.

This essay shows that most of the groundwork to accomplish this goal has been accomplished. The Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement was signed by the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1982, WHNS Feasibility Studies were completed in December 1984, and the implementing technical agreements are awaiting final Department of Defense staffing action. WHNS must become "U.S. doctrine" and must be presented in appropriate technical and field manuals that would foster a better understanding of the German Territorial Army:

- o an Army that is structured identically to its Field Army counterparts,
- o an Army that plans to have up to six of its Home Defense Brigades serving in Field Army divisions.
- o a force with its primary mission being the security of the Rear Combat Zone.

Conversely, WHNS elements of the German Territorial Army would be integrated and called upon to practice and prove their skills during joint NATO exercises.

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INTEGRATION OF GERMAN TERRITORIAL FORCES IN NATO PLANNING

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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1 May 1986

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Heinz Fiebig, LTC, OD

TITLE: Integration of German Territorial Forces in NATO Planning

FORMAT: Individual Essay

DATE: 1 May 1986 PAGES: 24 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The peacetime strengths of the German Armed Forces by law cannot exceed 500,000 soldiers. However, its wartime strengths will grow to 1.34 million soldiers. Therefore, over 800,000 soldiers are members of the German reserve system, with the majority assigned to the Territorial Army. The increased awareness by the U.S. of the rear area threat in the event of war in Germany, coupled with the commitment by the Federal Republic of Germany to provide 93,000 Wartime Host Nation Support "soldiers" to reinforced U.S. forces, demands that we fully understand the contributions of the German Territorial Army. The realization that Wartime Host Nation Support to U.S. forces is a direct responsibility of the German Territorial Army, and this support will impact on the way NATO forces wage war in the event of Warsaw Pact aggression, mandates the formal integration of the Territorial Army into the NATO planning system.

This essay shows that most of the groundwork to accomplish this goal has been accomplished. The Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement was signed by the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1982, WHNS Feasibility Studies were completed in December 1984, and the implementing technical agreements are awaiting final Department of Defense staffing action. WHNS must become "U.S. doctrine" and must be presented in appropriate technical and field manuals that would foster a better understanding of the German Territorial Army:

- o an Army that is structured identically to its Field Army counterparts.
- o an Army that plans to have up to six of its Home Defense Brigades serving in Field Army divisions.
- o a force with its primary mission being the security of the Rear Combat Zone.

Conversely, WHNS elements of the German Territorial Army would be integrated and called upon to practice and prove their skills during joint NATO exercises.

The most recent revitalization of the German Territorial Army and the 1982 German-American Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement has significantly changed the conditions under which NATO forces will wage war. Coupled with an increased awareness by the U.S. of the rear area threat, these changes have made it imperative that we fully understand, and integrate into our plans and procedures, this added capability and the methods needed to employ it. Of all the NATO countries, the Federal Republic of Germany is most concerned with a credible forward defense and yet faces real limits on her ability to contribute. As the peacetime strengths of the German Armed Forces by law cannot exceed 500,000 soldiers, its reserve forces are absolutely key to its combat role. Under German plans, the wartime strengths of the Bundeswehr will grow to 1.34 million service personnel by 1987. Therefore, over 800,000 soldiers are members of the German reserve system, with the majority assigned to the Territorial Army.¹ As these large Territorial Army Forces remain under German control even during war, their contribution to NATO is not directly obvious. However, since NATO in its defense planning considers all of Germany as part of the combat zone in the event of war, the German Territorial Army must be viewed, de facto, as part of the German Army and cannot be viewed as an independently operating branch of service. The role of the Territorial Army is inextricably linked to the mission of the German Army which, simply stated, is identical with the NATO mission of forward defense. The German Army, the Bundeswehr, is tasked to maintain the freedom of operation and provide host nation support to all NATO forces operating within its territory. The bulk of this "secondary" mission is carried out by the Territorial Army.²



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A quick look at the organizational chart (Figure 1) of the German Army defines the Army as consisting of Field Forces and Territorial Army under the same Chief of Staff of the Army, underlining the idea of the one-Army concept. Further linkage of the two forces is established by the assignment of one home defense brigade from the German Territorial Southern Command to the 1st Mountain Division, II (GE) Corps, and one home defense brigade from the Territorial Command Schleswig-Holstein to the 6th Armored Infantry Division, I (GE) Corps. Additionally, the peacetime command structure in the Territorial Army is made up of "Regular Army" officers and enlisted soldiers. However, since the Territorial Army has an area-wide command and force structure, it is also linked to the political subdivisions of Germany. Figure 2 identifies the three territorial commands, six military districts, 29 military regions, and 80 military subregions.

It is of critical importance that a system of close cooperation exist, not only in peacetime but especially during war, between these Territorial Forces and their NATO counterparts. An effective liaison officer exchange program, joint planning, command post and field training exercise participation, and, especially, personal contacts are essential. The military counterparts of the territorial command organization are as follows:


Territorial Commands: Army Groups, ATAFs, Allied National Commands
(Example: Territorial Command South cooperates directly with CENTAG, 4 ATAF, USAREUR, the 21st Support Command, the 32nd Air Defense Command)

Military District Commands: Corps, National Logistic Support Commands

Military Region Commands: Divisions

Military Subregion Commands: Brigades³


Organization of the Army



* One of these brigades is assigned to a division of the Army Field Forces

FIGURE 1

TERRITORIAL COMMAND AREAS



Shown here are the three Territorial Commands, Schleswig-Holstein, North and South, as well as the six military districts. The latter are further subdivided into 29 military regions and 80 military subregions.

FIGURE 2

Although the Territorial Army always remains under national command, this counterpart arrangement clearly shows the Territorial Army's involvement with NATO forces and its contribution to NATO's integrated forward defense by:

- . maintaining the freedom of maneuver in near areas of all forces on German soil,
- . providing the entire Army with manpower replacements and material support,
- . ensuring, to a great extent, the medical care and support for the forces,
- . providing for civil-military cooperation,
- . supporting the Air Force, the Navy, the Bundeswehr Administration, and Civil Defense,
- . supporting the planned reinforcement of US forces by units activated for that purpose, and by
- . cooperating closely with all allied forces.⁴

A careful reading of the Territorial Army's mission, as outlined in the White Paper 1985, also identifies three implied missions which require restatement and analysis. These three missions also demand intensive NATO-Territorial Army planning and execution:

- . Rear area security
- . Field Army reserves
- . Wartime Host Nation Support

Rear Area Security is a complex issue. NATO agreements require Germany to guarantee "freedom of operations" for NATO forces on her territory. In effect, Germany must provide freedom of maneuver for all allied forces and, by special agreement with the US, further support this effort via the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS). NATO agreement and directives call for NATO commanders in the rear combat zone to provide security for themselves as well as for their facilities and installations.⁵ Because of the threat and

the many types of units in the rear, commanders also understand that a clear delineation of responsibilities is vitally important. Command and control of the various forces, and various nationalities is not easily accomplished. General Major Dr. Greiner, the former commander of the Territorial Army Command South, explained, during a lecture at the Army War College, command responsibilities as follows:

- Where rear area protection is part of the conduct of operations, in the divisional areas for example, the respective NATO commander is in charge.
- Where NATO units are not conducting operations, rear area protection is a responsibility of the Territorial Army.

He then went on to explain that the territorial commands also represent the interests of civil emergency planning and other elements of the German armed forces to the NATO commander and must coordinate with him the employment of Territorial Army Forces. Conversely, where rear area protection is part of the support task of "maintaining the freedom of operation" or where it is provided on the basis of agreements entered into with NATO commanders, the territorial commanders are responsible for providing it. They can then also employ units of the National Field Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and of the Allied forces if their higher headquarters agree. The acceptance of this simple common sense approach to command and control, universally adopted by all NATO members, would significantly contribute to an improvement in NATO force planning and execution.

Although the White Paper states that the Home Defense Brigades, along with the balance of the Territorial Army, remain under national control, the Field Army Commander will undoubtedly request their early release to the Field Army. After all, his "4th Brigade" in peacetime has been fully integrated in NATO planning, participated in field exercises, and in the finest military

tradition has become a member of his team. It will be difficult to deny a division commander the use of his "4th Brigade" as a reserve force, especially when his three field army brigades are fully committed to the battle along the west German border. Yet, given current Warsaw Pact Forces doctrine which calls for the deployment of airborne units with light armor capability deep into NATO rear areas, the primary mission of the home defense brigades must be combat in the rear area. Rear area security must remain the principal mission of these "Field Army" trained, highly mobile, home defense brigades. If they become committed to forward defense, the rear area security mission, which they were created to resolve, again becomes unmanageable. Their missions are not only carried out to protect the rear area units, installations, communications and traffic nodes, but especially to keep the rear of the forward deployed NATO forces - at the inner German border - clear of enemy forces. Again, this job must remain the primary mission of the Territorial Army. The German Field Army or Allied NATO Army Commanders should not plan on the commitment of the Home Defense Brigades as NATO reserve forces.

However, Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) is support that must be planned on to maximize the commitment of combat forces while many rear area support and security missions are executed by the host nation. It should be understood that Germany, as the host nation, provides "Host Nation Support" to all NATO member countries that are committed to its territory. This is best exemplified by the host nation support that is provided to the four US divisions stationed in Germany during peacetime. Wartime Host Nation Support, however, is distinctly different from the "normal," perhaps "routine" host nation support rendered to all NATO members. In the case of the United States, it means dedicated military and civilian support provided by Germany primarily in support of six US armored, mechanized, infantry divisions, and

associated flying squadrons during crisis or war. The conviction that the defense capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance would be enhanced by dedicated wartime host nation support led to this landmark agreement between the governments of Germany and the United States.⁶ In this agreement, Germany is committed to providing the following support:

- . security of the installations of the US air and land forces
- . support of the US air forces on a joint operating basis, including airfield maintenance
- . transport and transloading services
- . evacuation of casualties
- . prisoner of war handling
- . decontamination of personnel and equipment
- . integration of members of the Labor Service of the United States forces, stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, who are under military service obligation in the Federal Republic of Germany into Federal Armed Forces units activated to support the United States Forces.

Additionally, civilian support would be provided:

- . transport of personnel, materiel, ammunition, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants by mail, road, and waterways.
- . maintenance and repair services, as well as other services, including materiel handling
- . subscriber telephone and teletype equipment
- . facilities for wartime stationing
- . expendable supplies and food supplies
- . cooperation in meeting the requirement for civilian labor
- . exemption from military service for the civilian work force of the United States forces and of contractors supporting the United States forces.
- . materiel mobilization augmentation (vehicles, construction, and depot equipment)

Annex 1 of the WHNS agreement lists the model computations for its organizations and personnel strengths for peacetime and war contingencies. Exact determinations would be made in a technical agreement after completion of feasibility studies. Nevertheless, an approximate ceiling was established for a wartime strength of 93,329 personnel spaces. A peacetime strength of 1,207 military, 598 civilian, and 537 Reserve Training Spaces was established.⁷ Above all, the basic agreement recognized that the WHNS must, to the extent possible, be tested and exercised during peacetime. This statement is a clear mandate for the Armed Forces of Germany and the United States to cooperate, plan, and execute exercises which incorporate the deployment of WHNS "troops" in peacetime and to insure their competence and readiness during crisis or war.

Completed feasibility studies conducted between the Federal Ministry of Defense and Headquarters USAREUR/USAFE identified minor changes, such as the elimination of "prisoner of war handling" along with changes relating to the US Division reorganizations, Division 86, and Army of Excellence. More importantly, it is the German Territorial Army that has been charged with the implementation of the WHNS agreement.⁸ Their responsibility encompasses training, deployment, and logistics support for all WHNS troops, including the establishment of a "working relationship" with appropriate US headquarters. This Territorial Army mission aligns them more closely with the German Field Army and bridges a gap between its purely national deployment and the one Army concept stressed by the US Army.

It is clear that the Territorial Army, in assuming a distinctly identifiable NATO support role, must be more closely involved in the NATO planning cycle. Yet, it should be recognized by US planners that the WHNS organizations have been organized on the agreed to premise that their primary












deployment area would be in the "Rear Combat Zone." Accordingly, WHNS troops were organized into mobile and stationary troop elements. This limitation of deployment must be clearly understood.

Logistical support and sustainability are key in the use of WHNS units; the sustainability of mobile troops is planned for, "mobile" deployment of "stationary" units is not anticipated under the current concept. (Figure 3 identifies mobile and stationary support elements.) The WHNS Feasibility Study also recognizes that additional personnel will be required in peacetime to implement the WHNS concept, man its training centers, and provide liaison personnel to US headquarters. Accordingly, the active duty strength of the Territorial Army has been increased by 171 officers, 406 non-commissioned officers, and 119 enlisted soldiers. In addition to these 696 soldiers, an additional 542 civil service employees were authorized. It was projected that WHNS soldiers would be available in a time-phased basis as follows:

1983	1,000	
1984	7,000	
1985	16,000	
1986	23,800	
1987	27,800	Total of 75,600 soldiers ⁹

It should be understood that the identification of these WHNS soldiers is not synonymous with deployability. These soldiers, targeted for their WHNS function, must be programmed for training within the Territorial Army system (training is usually conducted every other year) prior to their availability for a WHNS - US training exercises. Given these constraints, it appears that it will be four years from 1983 (e.g. 1987) before the first 1,000 WHNS soldiers could be available for joint training exercises.

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This chart depicts the anticipated deployment of WHNS soldiers in a stationary and mobile role. Units shown in the left hand column (stationary) are security forces for US Air Force and US Army Installations as well as Decontamination BN's; the right column (mobile) identifies six security companies for US Lance BN's, Logistical Support Units, and five Medical Transport BN's.

FIGURE 3

The final documents, the "how to" technical agreements, which implement the US-German WHNS agreement of April 22, 1982, have not completed their US Department of Defense staffing action as of February 1986. It is interesting to note that the technical agreements identify the principal benefactor of the German Wartime Host Nation Support on the title page.¹⁰

"US-German Agreement Concerning Host Nation Support From Military Sources for the Reinforced US Forces During Crisis or War."

"US-German Agreement Concerning Host Nation Support From Civilian Sources for the Reinforced US Forces During Crisis or War."

In the final analysis, these two documents, once fully implemented by their respective governments, will represent the green light for final "soldier implementation" by the Armed Forces of Germany and the US.

Despite the lack of final implemental instruction, considerable ground work has been accomplished. The US Army's Logistic Center must implement the Civilian Technical Agreement within the US force structure. US Coordination Teams, preferably with German language capability, need to be identified, trained, and deployed with reinforcing US divisions. Likewise, the JFK Center for Special Warfare and Military Assistance will develop the civil-military affairs teams. These teams, already identified in the National Guard/Reserve Force structure, are undergoing German language training, and have participated in joint U.S.-German exercises in Germany. It is commendable that this type of training is being conducted without the benefit of final implementation instructions. A review of the latter documents (still awaiting staffing action/approval) indicates that the complexity of Wartime Host Nation Support demands the publication of a detailed US Field Manual and Technical Manual. Of course, the introduction of this subject into the appropriate

TRADOC school system would be the final step in institutionalizing Wartime Host Nation Support. A detailed look at the civilian and military technical agreement will support this contention.

US-German Agreement Concerning Host Nation Support From Military Sources for the Reinforced US Forces During Crisis or War (Draft)

In article 1 of this document, the status of the "Labor Service" units, recently renamed Civilian Support Units, has been clarified. The specific tasks performed in peacetime by these units will be performed during crisis or war by support forces of the German army. In order not to lose the technical expertise of these personnel, they will be integrated into the specific German Army unit that has been designated to provide the wartime support and will return to their former "US Forces" jobs. In Article 2, the principles of support are defined. These support units will be commanded and operated in accordance with German rules and principles; German Support Forces may only assume those tasks as defined in the German Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs).

Military support requirements of the US Forces, beyond the services provided by the Federal Armed Forces under the terms of this agreement, will be met by US Forces; and, when required during crisis or war, US Forces will provide medical care and NBC decontamination to German Forces.

This brief look identifies the need for clear-cut instructions in US manuals to implement WHNS. Clearly, valuable services will be provided by Germany, but obligations will be incurred by the US as well - obligations that will force us to learn the "German System" if optimal benefit is to be gained from WHNS.

Some of these lessons will be painful learning experiences. For example, German Support Forces will accomplish their tasks on the basis of the German principle of "Anweisung auf Zusammenarbeit" which does not translate into the US terms OPCON or ATTACHED. This term means OBLIGATORY COOPERATION as defined and explained in an annex. Since a succinct explanation in a paragraph or two cannot define the term OBLIGATORY COOPERATION, "soldier language and explanations" must be developed and published in a WHNS Field Manual. Copying the definition as outlined in the draft agreement will not do. Hopefully, reading the next three pages will support this point.

ANNEX B

Specific Arrangements Regarding the Command Status of German Support Forces

On the basis of Article 3, the following details are agreed upon as
pertains to the command status of German Support Forces.

I. General

1. The term "Anweisung auf Zusammenarbeit" (obligatory cooperation) is
defined as:

Commanders or military leaders between whom no institutional status
of subordination exists and who are to cooperate in a special way
are specifically directed by order to cooperate. Cooperation
includes the obligation to inform, advise, and support each other in
all matters where joint execution is required by military necessity.

2. As it particularly pertains to this Agreement, obligatory cooperation
means:

Commanders or leaders of the German Support Forces directed to
cooperate with the US Forces are obligated, in the performance of
their mission, to carry out with the troop units assigned to them,
all tasks requested by the supported US command authorities or US
commanders insofar as they are in consonance with

- the stipulated extent of support (Article 1, paragraph 1),
- the German Command and Operational Principles (Article 2,
paragraph 1), and
- the German TOE of the unit concerned (Article 2, paragraph 3).

This obligation specifically includes the observance of the
priorities requested by the US Forces.

3. In the case of any US request which might exceed the scope of support
set forth above, the responsible US and German commanders will
endeavor to reach joint agreement. Where approval is required by the

German commander, that approval will be requested of the responsible Territorial Commander, Support Command commander or German Air Force or Navy commander, respectively.

4. If, in pressing situations, the temporary employment of German Support Forces is required for tasks which are not directly in support of US Forces, the responsible German commander (paragraph 3, above) will coordinate with and obtain approval from the responsible US commander.

II. Provisions Regarding the German Army

1. German Army Support Forces will be commanded and controlled through existing commands of the German Territorial Army or through special German Support Commands.
2. German Army support forces under command of German Territorial Army subcommands cooperate under obligatory cooperation with the supported US unit. German Army Support Commands cooperate under obligatory cooperation with the US Support command in each US Corps, with the US Army Theater Support Commands or other US commands to which they are directed by the Federal Ministry of Defense or its designated command authorities.
3. Units of German Army Support Commands which are directed to cooperate with US commands or US units for the accomplishment of their missions will receive day-to-day mission requirements directly via the US technical, planning, or management agencies within the US commands (e.g., Materiel Management Center - MMC -, Movement Control Center -MCC -, Transportation Movement Office - TMO -, Medical Regulating Office - MRO -).

4. US commanders who are supported by a German Support Command containing other German units, which are detailed in plans to support another US command (e.g., Casualty Evacuation Battalion for USAFE) will make no requests regarding these other German units. The US commander who is supported by such a German unit will coordinate directly with the German Support Command regarding employment of the unit.

III. Provisions Regarding the German Air Force and the German Navy

German Air Force and Navy Support Forces will be directed by order to cooperate with US commands at all supported locations as is written in Article 3 and Annex B, Section I. At German Collocated Operating Bases (COBs), the German Support Forces are integrated in the existing organizational structure of the host nation unit (TOE).

The German Air Force ADR Squadrons employed at US and US/Canadian operating bases and at the German civilian Aerial Ports of Debarkation will be fully subordinate to the German Air Force Engineer Regimental Headquarters.

Other articles and annexes of the technical agreement deal, in equally legalistic language, with the specifics of the military support of WHNS. Many other aspects specify costs that will be incurred by Germany and the US. Final consummation of this agreement will undoubtedly assist program and budget officers in projecting the US share of the cost for the estimated 93,000 German WHNS personnel. It would be prudent to present the large cost incurred by Germany, and the savings realized by the US, as an example of allied commitment to the Alliance especially in view of current defense budget problems.

In addition to WHNS provided by military sources, substantial assistance will also be provided by civilian sources. The existing 200-page draft agreement, Host Nation Support from Civilian Sources for the Reinforced US Forces During Crisis or War, spells out in detail the extent of such support. Included are sample formats to request supplies and services; transport of personnel, materiel, ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants by all means, along with maintenance and repair services which may be requested are listed. Provisions for subscriber telephone and teletype equipment, facilities for wartime stationary, and procurement and provision of expendable items and food supplies are also made. Lastly, the procurement of required civilian labor, exemption from military service, and materiel mobilization augmentation of motor vehicles, construction, and depot equipment are explained.

A key feature of the agreement is the proviso for preplanning support. Headquarters, USAREUR has been charged with requesting civilian support, in writing, not directly from the civilian sources, but from the German Territorial Command in whose area the support is to be rendered. These requests are to be submitted in German, using metric units of weights and

measurements and German descriptions. The Territorial Command will determine whether the requested support can be provided by contract or in accordance with German requisition legislation.

Article 8 contains a landmark provision which exempts from military service in the Federal Armed Forces during crisis or war, persons who are employed by the US Forces in functions vital to the war effort.

As with the military technical agreement, detailed instructions pertaining to the settlement of accounts and compensation complete the basic agreement. Twelve annexes, some 180 pages, of instructions in excruciating detail, with a plethora of trilingual forms completes the entire agreement.

It appears that the successful implementation of the Civilian Technical Agreement lies in its provision for pre-planned support and the assistance of the designated Territorial Army office responsible for the implementation of WHNS. Indications are that not all sectors of the German civilian bureaucracies support the requirements of this agreement enthusiastically. It should be understood that during war we may well be asking for supplies which are desperately needed by the German civilian population. Hard decisions will have to be made and, if at all possible, they must favor the support requirements of NATO forces. As with the military technical agreement, provisions of this agreement must also be incorporated into US WHNS Field and Technical manuals as required.

Almost four years have passed since the US-German WHNS Agreement was signed on 15 April 1982. Negotiations among German agencies, civilian and military, USEUCOM, USAFE, and USAREUR undoubtedly were difficult; however, the final ratification of the civilian and military agreement, which implements the basic document, will only mark the beginning of the "real work" that lies

ahead. The training and exercising of the Wartime Host Nation Support system during actual joint field training exercises. Wartime Host Nation Support will achieve the credibility it deserves only when a US unit, during a future joint exercise, calls for legitimate civilian or military resources from WHNS and it materializes. Until that day, Wartime Host Nation Support will remain a "paper tiger" to the naysayers and doubters.

Hopefully, this article has shown that the Territorial Army, by the nature of its primary mission and its operational area, will have more contact and interface with NATO forces than the forward deployed field Army. (Figure 4 graphically illustrates this point.) Additionally, active duty Territorial Force officers are Regular Army officers (No comparison can be made to the US Reserve Officer system). These officers are trained NATO officers, understand the NATO planning system, and eagerly seek out contacts with US counterpart forces in their areas of responsibility. This ad hoc relationship must be formalized, especially since the Wartime Host Nation Support mission was officially assigned to the Territorial Army. Hopefully, the consummation of the civilian and military technical agreement will speed up this process.

The formulation of WHNS as "US doctrine," presented in appropriate technical and field manuals, would foster a better understanding of the German Territorial Army:

- o an army that is structured identically to its Field Army counterparts.
- o an army that will have up to six of its Home Defense Brigades serve as "4th Brigade" in Field Army divisions and trained to NATO proficiency standards.
- o a force with its primary mission being the security of the Rear Combat Zone.

The Army in forward defence




FIGURE 4

US RAOC forces, primarily early deploying reserve forces and German Territorial Forces, should form joint staffs during peacetime in order to plan and exercise the complexities of the rear area battle. With more and more support missions, including the RAOC task, becoming the domain of the US reserve units, a small force of highly professional US reserve officers should be called to active duty to work with the German Territorial Forces responsible for WHNS on a full-time basis in Germany.

It is realized that WHNS will only be fully activated during crisis or war, but it is also recognized that key leadership and management positions must be manned during peacetime. Germany has responded by having increased the active duty strength by 1,238 spaces to orchestrate the peacetime challenges of its WHNS mission. The U.S. must respond similarly and form its liaison commands (Verbindungskommandos) for WHNS in peacetime. Their job is too complex and too important to have it performed on a part-time basis by "special duty" personnel. To activate WHNS liaison commands during war, without the benefit of a fully trained US-German cadre in place during peacetime, will be a costly mistake. Much work has already been accomplished; much still needs to be done. The importance of testing and exercising WHNS was deemed so important that it appears in the preamble to the original agreement of 22 April 1982. Testing and exercising imply training; and the training of WHNS personnel may well prove to be the Achilles heel of this program.

The WHNS units' personnel will be trained in the same way as comparable active duty personnel or reservists of the Federal Armed forces. This also applies to the type, extent, duration, and frequency of mobilization exercises. Considering that the overall mobilization requirement, including the mobilization for WHNS, exceeds 800,000 personnel, only 180,325 reservists

received training in 1984. This training shortfall has been recognized by Germany, and active duty spaces for reserve training were increased to 6,600 spaces by 1986, making it possible to recall and train more than 200,000 reservists per year. It is projected for the 1990's, that the number of reserve duty trainers will increase to 15,000, which will enable up to 400,000 reservists to be recalled for training and to practice their wartime mission.¹¹ Hopefully, those soldiers and selected civilians designated to provide WHNS will be among them and will be able to prove their skills and their commitment during joint NATO exercises. To achieve this goal, the Territorial Army of the Federal Republic of Germany must be fully integrated into NATO planning. Although they remain under national command, their mission is a NATO mission, and they are an integral part of the German Army. Let us test the Territorial Army's professionalism in future joint exercises.

ENDNOTES

1. White Paper 1985. The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces. (Bonn, 19 June 1985, published by the Federal Minister of Defence on behalf of the Federal Government), p. 255.
2. This concept was presented to students of the US Army War College during a lecture in 1985 by General Major, Dr. Gottfried Greiner, German Army, (Retired).
3. Ibid.
4. White Paper 1985, p. 190.
5. Handbook for the Cooperation of the German Territorial Headquarters with Allied Armed Forces and National Civil Authorities (GE-CIMIC-HANDBOOK) (Bonn, January 1977), Chapter 7, Paragraph 704.
6. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Host Nation Support during Crisis or War (Bonn, 22 April 1982). (Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement is the short title.)
7. WHNS Agreement, Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1982, Teil II, (Bonn, 22 April 1982), p. 456.
8. The concept that the WHNS organization will become the responsibility of the Territorial Army was first proposed (and has since then been accepted) in the Ergebnisbericht der Realisierbarkeitsuntersuchungen WHNS für den Bereich des Heeres. (Bonn, 8 December 1983). p. 8.
9. Ibid., Inclosure 10.
10. These agreements are commonly referred to as the "Technical Agreements." When completed, they will implement the basic WHNS agreement of 22 April 1982, and will specify the support provided by Germany from civilian and military sources. Their official titles are: Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the Federal Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Host Nation Support From Civilian Sources for the Reinforced US Forces During Crisis or War; (The words from Military Sources are substituted in the latter agreement.)
11. White Paper 1985, pp. 256-258.

END
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